Mechanism design

Results: 750



#Item
51Dirk Bergemann Joan Feigenbaum Yale University  Economics and Computation

Dirk Bergemann Joan Feigenbaum Yale University Economics and Computation

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Source URL: zoo.cs.yale.edu

Language: English - Date: 2008-09-19 13:58:05
52Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items∗ Sergiu Hart †

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items∗ Sergiu Hart †

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Source URL: ma.huji.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2014-05-27 09:18:37
53CPSC 455b: Written Homework Assignment #3 Due in class on Tuesday, April 16, 2002 These exercises are drawn from the following papers (all obtainable from http://pantheon.yale.edu/~sz38) and the related lectures and disc

CPSC 455b: Written Homework Assignment #3 Due in class on Tuesday, April 16, 2002 These exercises are drawn from the following papers (all obtainable from http://pantheon.yale.edu/~sz38) and the related lectures and disc

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Source URL: zoo.cs.yale.edu

Language: English - Date: 2011-08-29 17:33:56
54Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela, Xianwen Shi April 8, 2008 Abstract We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents wi

Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela, Xianwen Shi April 8, 2008 Abstract We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents wi

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
55Vickrey Auction  VCG Combinatorial Auctions

Vickrey Auction VCG Combinatorial Auctions

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Source URL: www-tcs.cs.uni-sb.de

Language: English - Date: 2016-03-29 17:50:24
56Weak Ex Ante Collusion and Design of Supervisory Institutions1 Dilip Mookherjee2 , Alberto Motta3 and Masatoshi Tsumagari4 This Version: October 18, 2015 Abstract A Principal seeks to design a mechanism for an agent (pri

Weak Ex Ante Collusion and Design of Supervisory Institutions1 Dilip Mookherjee2 , Alberto Motta3 and Masatoshi Tsumagari4 This Version: October 18, 2015 Abstract A Principal seeks to design a mechanism for an agent (pri

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Source URL: thred.devecon.org

Language: English - Date: 2016-05-27 10:46:01
57Prior-Free Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders∗ Sayan Bhattacharya† Elias Koutsoupias‡  Janardhan Kulkarni§

Prior-Free Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders∗ Sayan Bhattacharya† Elias Koutsoupias‡ Janardhan Kulkarni§

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-05-17 21:55:22
58Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: ∗ Recent Results and Future Directions †  ‡

Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: ∗ Recent Results and Future Directions † ‡

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Source URL: www.cs.yale.edu

Language: English - Date: 2002-09-14 14:49:21
59Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games? Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Athens, Athens, G

Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games? Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Athens, Athens, G

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Source URL: www.softlab.ntua.gr

Language: English - Date: 2010-10-04 13:24:12
60CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #5: Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 7,

CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #5: Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 7,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:28:39